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BUMBLING ALONG 
By Robert Schrire 
Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town 
South Africa has achieved political democracy but the big challenge still lies ahead of us. 
The route is fraught with dangers. A look at the current political, social and economic map 
of the country indicates that we are bumbling along a middle road scenario towards a mixed 
First World- Third World society which could, with sound management, lead to further 
development and stable democracy. 
I t is difficult for even the most astute observer to discern patterns in the political economy of a rapidly changing society. This is particularly 
so when personalities are so vitally 
important in shaping the larger outcomes. 
Whenever we focus on personalities, we are 
likely to be surprised by the. vagiaries of 
human behaviour. 
Who would have expected dramatic changes 
from the pre-1990 FW de Klerk? Not only 
was he perceived as conservative, but as one 
of his close associates remarked: "The 
problem with De Klerk is not that he is 
reactionary but that he refuses to take 
decisions." 
Yet this same De Klerk launched a 
programme of reform which has left all of us 
amazed. Similarly, the future of South Africa 
will be shaped largely by the actions and 
inactions of a handful of leaders: Nelson 
Mandela, De Klerk and Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi. 
Whereas in developed societies such as the 
United States or Britain it doesn't really 
matter who is in charge, in a politically 
developing society such as South Africa, it 
does. Indeed, the single most important factor 
which will determine our future will be the 
quality of our leadership. 
But leaders do not operate in a vacuum. They 
are part of the polity and the value system of 
their societies. The political landscape 
provides a context of restraints and 
opportunities. Now that the elections are 
over, it is possible to discern the contours of 
this political landscape, or power map. 
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The power map 
It has been said that. the results of the April 
elections are 'designer results'. What is 
meant by this is that the results are as 
conducive to a democratic future as is 
possible under our unique circumstances. 
With the best intentions in the world, nothing 
is more dangerous for a democratic system 
than a landslide victory where the victor is 
likely to remain in power for a long time. 
Although the African National Congress 
(ANC) emerged from the elections as the 
clear winner, its power is limited by the 
following: 
o The failure of the ANC to win a 
two-thirds majority in the National 
Assembly. Although even a simple 
majority enables the winning party to ride 
roughshod over its rivals, a two-thirds 
majority conveys the wrong message to 
the winners and may encourage them to 
treat the losers with disdain. 
Psychologically it was very important for 
no party to win the magic two-thirds 
majority and the right to write the 
constitution unilaterally; 
o The success of the National Party (NP) in 
obtaining more than 20% of the total vote 
and in winning majority support from the 
white, coloured and Asian communities. 
Not only did this entitle the NP to occupy 
a deputy presidency and important cabinet 
positions, but psychologically it ensures 
that an opposition party has crossed an 
important barrier which marks the 
difference between at least a partial 
victory and total defeat; 
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• The failure of the ANC to win control 
over two of the three most important 
provinces. The convincing NP win in the 
Western Cape and the somewhat 
surprising victory of the lnkatha Freedom 
Party (lFP) in KwaZulu-Natal will 
balance the power of the ANC in the 
other seven provinces and ensure that real 
restraints exist on central government 
power; 
As a result of these electoral outcomes, 
other balancing mechanisms become 
more important. The Government of 
National Unity (GNU) could never be a 
substitute for electoral performance. If the 
ANC had achieved a massive victory at 
the polls and no other party had achieved 
a credible level of voter support, the GNU 
would have been an empty shell from the 
very beginning. 
Now at least the junior partners will have 
real clout. Similarly the constitutional 
principles agreed upon during mUlti-party 
negotiations and new institutions such as 
the Constitutional Court take on a new 
lease of life. 
• The political balance of power probably 
also reduces the possbilities of clashes 
between the state bureaucracy, including 
the security services, and the new political 
elite. Had the ANC been the only major 
parliamentary player, tensions and 
conflicts may have developed with the 
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white dominated and conservative public 
sector. 
The South African power map, then, can be 
summarised as follows: all but two players -
the ANC and the NP - were eliminated from 
national politics. At the provincial level the 
IFP is a major player because of its victory in 
KwaZulu-Natal, but its national aspirations 
have been shattered, probably permanently. 
What about the losers? It is a dangerous 
exercise to attempt to predict the political 
future, but is difficult to conceive of any 
circumstances which could lead to the 
resun'ection of the Democratic Party (DP), 
Freedom Front (FF) or Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC). 
These parties seem to have been struck a 
mortal blow and are likely to lose much of 
their already limited electoral support. Given 
a widespread perception that their growth 
prospects are limited, they are unlikely to 
attract the resources, especially finances, 
which are so necessary in today's politics. 
The options 
Although we cannot predict the future, we 
can outline the central issues and isolate the 
factors which will shape outcomes. Perhaps 
the most important questions are whether the 
polity will be stable, the new democracy will 
survive the new challenges and what policies, 
especially socio-economic, the new 
Government will adopt. 
The answer to these questions will determine 
South Africa's future. We may summarise 
the four possible outcomes as follows: 
o The Rwanda option 
South Africa disintegrates as a cooperative 
society and is dominated by conflict and 
violence. The road to this outcome would lie 
in the failure of the leaderhsip to contain 
regional conflicts, such as the power struggle 
in KwaZulu-Natal, and a breakdown in the 
functioning of the GNU. Armed force would 
become the arbiter of conflicts. 
o The Zambian option 
South Africa slides gradually into stagnation, 
decay and corruption. Endemic violence 
would not be the defining characteristic. 
Instead the nature of the South African 
society would change to one dominated by 
Third World elements. The First World 
oriented elites who presently dominate the 
South African political economy would 
gradually be displaced by Third World 
oriented elites, practices and policies. 









































o The bumbling along option 
South Africa is a mixed First World-Third 
World society in which democratisation 
increases the Third World influences on the 
political economy in the short term but does 
not destroy the First World component. 
Under this scenario, South Africa would 
continue to make significant economic 
progress and the democratic ideal would not 
be extinguished. However, the process would 
remain tenuous and a strong Third World 
element would continue to exist and would 
limit economic and political prospects. 
o The Singapore option 
This entails rapid progress towards a 
predominantly First World society in which 
the Third World components would be 
steadily reduced. In time, high levels of 
socio-economic development attained makes 
the survival of a First World democratic 
system unproblematic. 
South Africa is not unique in facing these 
issues. From a global perspective, we can 
find some of the answers by investigating the 
level of socio-economic development that 
exists in the society, and how the political 
winners and losers behave. 
Development 
The level of socio-economic development is 
a critical determinant of political success or 
failure. Levels of literacy, income per head 
and urbanisation largely determine whether a 
society will be a stable or an unstable 
democracy. Comparisons indicate that we can 
differentiate between three levels of 
development: 
o Highly developed societies characterised 
by high levels of literacy, affluence and 
large urban complexes. With very few 
exceptions, these societies also have 
stable democratic systems of government; 
o Middle income societies characterised by 
a strong, modem First World sector 
co-existing alongside a large Third World 
sector. An important section of the 
population is literate and relatively 
affluent, but another important section is 
not. A stable and democratic system of 
government is possible but not probable; 
o Underdeveloped societies with low levels 
of economic development and very 
limited literacy. With very few 
exceptions, these societies are neither 
democratic nor genuinely stable. 
If South Africa was either highly developed 
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or highly underdeveloped, we could 
confidently predict its political destiny, at 
least in the short term. 
For example, we can predict that politically at 
least the United States and Germany will not 
be very different from their present realities 
in five years time. We can be equally 
confident, alas, that Malawi, despite the 
present euphoria, will not be a stable 
democracy in five years time. 
The middle category of partially developed 
states are the most difficult to understand 
because their destinies are not 
socio-economically determined. In these 
cases, it is the quality of the leadership which 
is critical, particularly the actions of the 
winners and the losers of the political game. 
The winners 
Perhaps the single most important factor 
determining the political future of middle 
level societies is the behaviour of the political 
winners. Do they continue to play the game 
according to the rules? Are they 
magnanimous towards the losers? Do they 
adopt and implement sensible policies? 
Part of the key answer to understanding 
political behaviour lies in the arena of 
predispositions. If the ANC has a secret 
agenda to subvert the polity and implement 
populist policies, no constitution or court will 
be able to frsutrate them. 
However, the disastrous consequences for the 
ANC and its constituency of such policies has 
probably been perceived during the learning 
experience of the last four years. We are 
therefore not dealing with a group with a 
sinister and hidden agenda. 
No democratic society can base its survival 
on trust, however. Political power needs to be 
limited and constrained by countervailing 
powers. As I outlined earlier, our 'designer' 
elections produced an outcome favourable to 
a democratic South Africa. 
The ANC-dominated government is faced 
with powerful political forces outside of its 
control in the GNU as well as in the regional 
governments of the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and several of the ANC 
dominated provinces. It does not have the 
lUXury of a blank cheque in either making 
policy or implementing its decisions. 
As significant in constraining government is 
the domestic and global context in which 
government operates. It is almost universally 
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If the Government is to deliver its promises 
to its key constituencies, it has to be fully 
reincorporated into the global political 
economy. Only full reincorporation will lead 
to the necessary foreign investments, access 
to the key markets of Europe, North America 
and Asia, and support from global economic 
institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs. 
Similarly, control over Parliament does not 
automatically imply control over all the 
power points of South African society. The 
public bureaucracy, including the police and 
military, remain outside the unchallenged 
control of the ANC. Civil society, especially 
the media, the professions and business, civic 
associations and trade unions, value their 
independence greatly. 
Thus power is not what it used to be. The NP 
in 1948, with almost no support among black 
people, only minority support among the 
white electorate and very little sympathy 
abroad, could use its small parliamentary 
majority to grab control of the state and 
transform society. 
The ANC, with much greater popular 
support, is unable to lead but can only 
persuade. An ANC attempt to impose its will 
on South Africa would have disastrous 
consequences - not least for itself. 
Cooperation rather than confrontation will be 
the only path to achieving ANC goals such as 
economic reconstruction and development. 
President Mandela's speech at the opening of 
Parliament showed that most ANC leaders 
are fully aware of these brutal realities. 
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The losers 
The political losers often pose an even more 
serious threat to democracy and stability. 
Unlike the winners, they frequently have a 
vested interest in the failure of government 
and public policies. In many cases the failure 
of democratic government creates 
opportunities for power which would not 
otherwise be available to political minorities. 
We are perhaps fortunate in South Africa that 
the election outcome was, with the exception 
of KwaZulu-Natal, so decisive. Both the 
white right, represented by the Freedom 
Front, and the black 'left', represented by the 
PAC, were demolished and at present do not 
pose any real threat to the democratic order. 
It also seems improbable that their supporters 
will take up arms against the state or engage 
in other forms of illegal opposition on any 
significant scale. The psychological 
consequences of their political rout have been 
overwhelming and their ranks have become 
thoroughly demoralised. 
The future consequences of the policies of 
the IFP remain more problematic. The end of 
Inkatha's dream of being a major national 
player may conttibute to national 
reconciliation if rational considerations shape 
their policies. The elections showed that the 
IFP is exclusively a regional party. 
The situation in KwaZulu-Natal is more 
complex, partly because the power struggle 
has not been decisively resolved. Although 
the IFP was granted 51 % of the final vote, the 
ANC and others claimed widespread 
irregulatities. The situation is aggravated by 









































tensions and passions inherent in a situation 
of a lO-year struggle which has claimed the 
lives of thousands of people on both sides of 
the political divide. 
Outside of KwaZulu-Natal, the IFP has 
representatives in only one provincial 
parliament. The party leadership is unlikely 
to view itself as a possible national 
government in any future election, and this 
gives the IFP the incentive to cooperate as a 
minor partner in the ANC-dominated 
Government, while hoping that the 
Government stumbles and creates new 
opportunities for the expansion of opposition 
support. 
But the logic of cooperation created by the 
balance of forces at the national level may be 
overturned by the dynamics of personalities 
or by the negative dynamics which may flow 
from unresolved regional conflicts. 
The danger exists that conflict will continue 
in the region and that these conflicts may spill 
over into the GNU, destroying the national 
dialogue. Tragically the reverse dynamic 
does not exist: cooperation at the centre does 
not seem to influence regional conflicts. 
Conflict 
Politics is about conflict and democracy can 
be viewed as a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts peacefully. One consequence of our 
'uhuru' elections is that the conflict issues are 
blurred. 
Because the election was between the 'old 
order' and the 'liberation' party, both the 
ANC and the NP represent constellations of 
disparate and perhaps irreconcilable interests. 
When the great realignment takes place, what 
will the conflicts be and how will they be 
expressed? 
o Ethnic conflict 
Of all the potentially destructive conflicts 
which may tear a society asunder, ethnic 
conflicts are the most difficult to manage 
successfully. Because ethnicity is at least 
partly determined by contextual factors, 
conflicts based upon ethnic factors can take 
several forms. 
In South Africa, ethnic conflicts could pit 
blacks against whites (the two society model) 
or could involve several less inclusive 
groupings such as Xhosa and Zulu speakers 
(the multi-national model). 
o Economic conflict 
Economic conflicts do not necessarily entail 
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irreconcilable interest conflicts, but they can 
threaten the fabric of society by inhibiting 
economic growth and cooperation. The 
management of potential economic conflict is 
the foundation of all sound economic systems. 
In South Africa the uneasy co~xistence of 
nominal political equality with Vasqevels of 
economic inequality poses particuiarly'severe 
challenges to government. Conflicts between 
business and trade unions, land owners and . 
squatters, and in general the haves and the 
have nots, always contain the threat of 
dramatic escalation. 
This has been confIrmed by the recent strikes 
in the retail sector, where passions raised 
were disporportionate to the actual issues 
involved. Policies such as affirmative action, 
privatisation and land reform are particularly 
explosive. 
o Political conflict 
Although politics is about conflict, successful 
democracies have discovered mechanisms to 
ensure that conflicts do not reach a level 
where the stability and even existence of the 
political framework itself is under threat. 
Political contestation is restricted largely to 
policy outcomes rather than the nature of 
politics itself. 
In South Africa a legitimate framework has 
yet to be created. The ability of a GNU to 
contain destructive conflicts remains 
uncertain. The division and sharing of powers 
between the different levels of government 
has yet to be determined. And the vital 
machinery of state will have to meet the 
challenges to its efficient functions from new 
political elites, ambitious state policies and 
affIrmative action programmes. 
Prospects 
In this article I have tried to provide a 'road 
map' rather than a predition of our future. We 
cannot yet answer the key questions I raised 
about stability, democracy and rationality of 
our future polity and policy. Even a cursory 
look at the potential for conflict in our society 
can only make even an optimist cautious. 
However, on balance the omens are 
encouraging. We have survived a difficult 
transition and a traumatic election in 
reasonably good shape. The power balance 
between the political groups is favourable 
and the last four years have been useful in 
teaching all our political players some of the 
facts of our new reality. 
If we relate these factors to our earlier brief 
outline of possible futures, the following 
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tentative conclusions can be reached. 
The Rwanda option seems unlikely for 
several reasons. Firstly, the conflicts in South 
Africa do not create the inevitability of 
intractable ethnic, religious or racial conflicts. 
While the potential for such conflicts does 
exist, they are mitigated by other factors such 
as the absence of one numerically dominant 
ethnic community and the salience of 
economic and other material issues. 
In addition, the incumbent political elites 
have every incentive to cooperate with other 
members of the political elite, and seem to 
have learned the unacceptable costs of 
unregulated conflicts. 
The Zambian option also seems unlikely. 
Despite the socio-economic disparities in 
South Africa and the possibility that a 
majority of the population is rooted in Third 
World poverty and deprivation, the state and 
society seem to be firmly under the control of 
a multi-racial first world elite. 
While it is probable that Third World 
influence will increase, it is difficult to 
envisage circumstances under which the First 
World elements could be dislodged. South 
Africa differs from almost all its neighbours 
precisely because its First World component, 
both black and white, is so large and fIrmly 
entrenched. 
The Singapore scenario also seems unlikely. 
The prospects for economic growth are 
relatively modest and the size of the Third 
World community, coupled with very high 
birth rates, makes the rapid growth of First 
World elements unlikely. The apartheid 
legacy compounds the problem because it 
makes adopting economically optimal 
policies politically unviable. 
The most likely future is therefore going to 
be along the road of bumbling towards a 
mixed First W orld-Third W orId society. This 
road contains many dangers but seems to 
lead towards the gradual strengthening of the 
First World elements of our society. The 
major dangers include: 
o The incapacitation or death or President 
Mandela; 
o The legacy of the past which new 
institutions such as the Truth Commission 
could politicise with potentially 
destructive consequences; 
o Breakdown in political cooperation. The 
GNU is only a mechanism designed to 
achieve a level of inter-party cooperation 
and ensure that the political system is not 
endangered. Its breakdown would not by 
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itself destroy political stability, but the 
end of coalition government would 
encourage parties to place their own 
interests above any interest in stability 
and continuity. The inevitable tensions 
could undermine the system itself; 
o Unwise state economic policies, based 
upon a populism which sacrifices long 
term gains for short term applause. 
Policies of state income, expenditure and 
affIrmative action are particularly 
vulnerable to populist expansion; and 
o Mobilised special interests which have the 
power to ensure that their interests prevail 
over national and weaker interests. It is 
possible that powerful interests such as 
the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions will force a weak Government to 
follow popular but costly policies which 
destroy macro-economic balance and 
harm the interests of the least privileged, 
and hence weakest, sections of society 
such as the unemployed and rural 
peasantry. 
One factor does give rise to some concern: 
the absence of an alternative government to 
the ANC. Good government demands a 
strong opposition. While the present balance 
of power is a good beginning, it is difficult to 
see which of the existing parties could 
provide a credible future alternative to an 
ANC Government. 
It is unlikely that the NP, with its historical 
legacy as a white Afrikaner party, can 
achieve significant black support. None of 
the other parties, including the IFP, DP and 
PAC, seem to have significant growth 
prospects. The interim constitution makes it 
difficult for party rebels to split because to do 
so would force them to resign from 
Parliament. 
As a result, despite the desirability of a great 
realignment away from the present system-
versus-struggle party alignments, it is 
difficult to see how this could come about. 
And unless it does, it seems unlikely that the 
ANC majority will be seriously threatened. 
Managing change is never an easy task. 
Managing change in a democracy is even 
more diffIcult to do successfully. However, 
the record of our leaders and communities in 
adjusting to change is almost miraculous. 
Even five years ago, few of us would have 
believed our society had the capacity to 
adjust to the radical changes which have 
recently taken place. Yet we have done so 
reasonably well. The biggest challenge now 
lies ahead of us. We will not get another 
second chance. ~ 
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